Abortion is Murder Every time it is Perpetrated

Traditional Catholic Prayers: Abortion is murder

Abortion is murder. The legalisms are that one may commit this murder when a doctor is paid his fee for that "pound of flesh." (There is no NO difference between Shylock and abortion doctors, especially beginning with Alan Guttmacher and the Guttmacher Institute, and their murderess client baby murdering Mothers and Cain who killed Abel.) All copyrighted sources are quoted and used for comment and education in accord with the nonprofit provisions of: Title 17 U.S.C., Section 107 and in accordance with "Fair Use." source for below: http://ypdcrime.com/penal.law/article125.htm

New York Laws

Laws of New York - This site contains the full online searchable text of the New York Penal Law, the New York Criminal Procedure Law, the New York Vehicle & Traffic Law and some of theNew York Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws.

Article 125 - NY Penal Law

HOMICIDE, ABORTION AND RELATED OFFENSES
125.00 Homicide defined.
125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms.
125.10 Criminally negligent homicide.
125.11 Aggravated criminally negligent homicide.
125.12 Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree.
125.13 Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree.
125.14 Aggravated vehicular homicide.
125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree.
125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree.
125.21 Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree.
125.22 Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree.
125.25 Murder in the second degree.
125.26 Aggravated murder.
125.27 Murder in the first degree.
125.40 Abortion in the second degree.
125.45 Abortion in the first degree.
125.50 Self-abortion in the second degree.
125.55 Self-abortion in the first degree.
125.60 Issuing abortional articles.

S 125.00 Homicide defined.
  Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn
child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four
weeks under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first
degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent
homicide, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in the first
degree.


S 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms.
  The following definitions are applicable to this article:
  1. "Person," when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human
being who has been born and is alive.
  2. "Abortional act" means an act committed upon or with respect to a
female, whether by another person or by the female herself, whether she
is pregnant or not, whether directly upon her body or by the
administering, taking or prescription of drugs or in any other manner,
with intent to cause a miscarriage of such female.
  3. "Justifiable abortional act." An abortional act is justifiable when
committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician
acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve
her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her
pregnancy. A pregnant female`s commission of an abortional act upon
herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice of a duly licensed
physician (1) that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, (2)
within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. The
submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she
believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting
under a reasonable belief that such act is necessary to preserve her
life, or, within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her
pregnancy.

S 125.10 Criminally negligent homicide.
  A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with
criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.
  Criminally negligent homicide is a class E felony.

S 125.11 Aggravated criminally negligent homicide.
  A  person  is guilty of aggravated criminally negligent homicide when,
with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of a police officer
or peace officer where such officer was in the course of performing  his
or  her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.
  Aggravated criminally negligent homicide is a class C felony.

S 125.12 Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree.
  A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when
  he or she causes the death of another person, and either:
    (1)  operates  a motor vehicle in violation of subdivision two, three,
  four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the  vehicle  and
  traffic  law  or  operates  a  vessel  or  public vessel in violation of
  paragraph  (b),  (c),  (d)  or  (e)  of  subdivision  two   of   section
  forty-nine-a of the navigation law, and as a result of such intoxication
  or  impairment  by  the  use  of a drug, or by the combined influence of
  drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such motor  vehicle,
  vessel  or public vessel in a manner that causes the death of such other
  person, or
    (2) operates a motor vehicle with a gross  vehicle  weight  rating  of
  more  than  eighteen  thousand  pounds  which  contains  flammable  gas,
  radioactive materials or explosives in violation of subdivision  one  of
  section  eleven  hundred  ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, and
  such flammable gas, radioactive materials or explosives is the cause  of
  such  death,  and  as a result of such impairment by the use of alcohol,
  operates such motor vehicle in a manner that causes the  death  of  such
  other person, or
    (3) operates a snowmobile in violation of paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of
  subdivision  one  of section 25.24 of the parks, recreation and historic
  preservation law or operates  an  all  terrain  vehicle  as  defined  in
  paragraph   (a)   of  subdivision  one  of  section  twenty-two  hundred
  eighty-one of the vehicle and traffic law in  violation  of  subdivision
  two,  three, four, or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the
  vehicle and traffic law,  and  as  a  result  of  such  intoxication  or
  impairment  by  the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs
  or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates  such  snowmobile  or  all
  terrain vehicle in a manner that causes the death of such other person.
    If  it  is  established  that the person operating such motor vehicle,
  vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all  terrain  vehicle  caused  such
  death  while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or
  a drug, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as  a  result
  of  such  intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or
  by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or  drugs,
  such   person   operated  the  motor  vehicle,  vessel,  public  vessel,
  snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that caused such death, as
  required by this section.
  Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree is a class D felony.

S 125.13 Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree.
 A  person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree when
  he or she commits the crime of  vehicular  manslaughter  in  the  second
  degree as defined in section 125.12 of this article, and either:
    (1)  commits  such  crime  while  operating a motor vehicle while such
  person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of  alcohol  in  such
  person's  blood  as  shown  by chemical analysis of such person's blood,
  breath, urine or saliva made  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  section
  eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law;
    (2)  commits  such  crime while knowing or having reason to know that:
  (a) his or her license or his or her  privilege  of  operating  a  motor
  vehicle  in another state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license
  to operate a motor vehicle in another state is suspended or revoked  and
  such  suspension  or revocation is based upon a conviction in such other
  state for an offense which would, if committed in this state, constitute
  a  violation  of  any  of  the  provisions  of  section  eleven  hundred
  ninety-two  of the vehicle and traffic law; or (b) his or her license or
  his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in the state or his or
  her privilege of obtaining a license issued by the commissioner of motor
  vehicles is suspended or revoked and such suspension  or  revocation  is
  based  upon  either  a  refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to
  section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle  and  traffic  law  or
  following  a  conviction  for  a  violation  of any of the provisions of
  section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law;
    (3) has previously been convicted of violating any of  the  provisions
  of  section  eleven  hundred  ninety-two  of the vehicle and traffic law
  within the preceding ten years, provided that, for the purposes of  this
  subdivision,  a  conviction  in  any  other state or jurisdiction for an
  offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a  violation
  of  section  eleven  hundred  ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law,
  shall be treated as a violation of such law;
    (4) causes the death of more than one other person;
    (5) has previously been convicted of violating any provision  of  this
  article  or  article  one  hundred  twenty  of  this title involving the
  operation of a motor vehicle, or was convicted in  any  other  state  or
  jurisdiction  of  an  offense involving the operation of a motor vehicle
  which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of  this
  article or article one hundred twenty of this title; or
    (6)  commits  such crime while operating a motor vehicle while a child
  who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle
  and causes the death of such child.
    If it is established that the  person  operating  such  motor  vehicle
  caused  such death or deaths while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by
  the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of  drugs  or
  of  alcohol  and  any  drug  or  drugs, then there shall be a rebuttable
  presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by  the
  use  of  alcohol  or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of
  alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle in
  a manner that caused such death or deaths, as required by  this  section
  and section 125.12 of this article.
  Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree is a class C felony.

S 125.14  Aggravated vehicular homicide.
   A  person  is  guilty  of aggravated vehicular homicide when he or she
engages in reckless driving as defined by section twelve hundred  twelve
of  the  vehicle  and  traffic  law,  and commits the crime of vehicular
manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.12  of  this
article, and either:
  (1)  commits  such  crimes  while operating a motor vehicle while such
person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of  alcohol  in  such
person's  blood  as  shown  by chemical analysis of such person's blood,
breath, urine or saliva made  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  section
eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law;
  (2)  commits  such crimes while knowing or having reason to know that:
(a) his or her license or his or her  privilege  of  operating  a  motor
vehicle  in another state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license
to operate a motor vehicle in another state is suspended or revoked  and
such  suspension  or revocation is based upon a conviction in such other
state for an offense which would, if committed in this state, constitute
a  violation  of  any  of  the  provisions  of  section  eleven  hundred
ninety-two  of the vehicle and traffic law; or (b) his or her license or
his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in this state  or  his
or  her  privilege  of obtaining a license issued by the commissioner of
motor vehicles is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation
is based upon either a refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant  to
section  eleven  hundred  ninety-four  of the vehicle and traffic law or
following a conviction for a violation  of  any  of  the  provisions  of
section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law;
  (3)  has  previously been convicted of violating any of the provisions
of section eleven hundred ninety-two of  the  vehicle  and  traffic  law
within  the preceding ten years, provided that, for the purposes of this
subdivision, a conviction in any other  state  or  jurisdiction  for  an
offense  which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation
of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the  vehicle  and  traffic  law,
shall be treated as a violation of such law;
  (4) causes the death of more than one other person;
  (5)  causes the death of one person and the serious physical injury of
at least one other person;
  (6) has previously been convicted of violating any provision  of  this
article  or  article  one  hundred  twenty  of  this title involving the
operation of a motor vehicle, or was convicted in  any  other  state  or
jurisdiction  of  an  offense involving the operation of a motor vehicle
which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of  this
article or article one hundred twenty of this title; or
  (7)  commits  such crime while operating a motor vehicle while a child
who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle
and causes the death of such child.
  If it is established that the  person  operating  such  motor  vehicle
caused  such death or deaths while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by
the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of  drugs  or
of  alcohol  and  any  drug  or  drugs, then there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by  the
use  of  alcohol  or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of
alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle in
a manner that caused such death or deaths, as required by  this  section
and section 125.12 of this article.
   Aggravated vehicular homicide is a class B felony.

S 125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree.
  A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when:
  1. He recklessly causes the death of another person; or
  2. He commits upon a female an abortional act which causes her death,
unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three
of section 125.05; or
  3. He intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide.
  Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.

S 125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree.
  A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
  1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
  2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do
not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of
section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance
reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be
proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision; or
  3. He commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks
an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is
justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05; or
  4. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical
injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury
to such person and thereby causes the death of such person.
  Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.

S 125.21 Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree.
  A  person  is  guilty  of aggravated manslaughter in the second degree
when he or she recklessly causes the death of a police officer or  peace
officer  where  such  officer was in the course of performing his or her
official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should  have  known
that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.
  Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.

S 125.22 Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree.
  A  person  is  guilty  of  aggravated manslaughter in the first degree
when:
  1. with intent to cause serious physical injury to a police officer or
peace officer, where such officer was in the course of performing his or
her official duties and the defendant knew  or  reasonably  should  have
known  that  such  victim was a police officer or a peace officer, he or
she causes the death of such officer or another police officer or  peace
officer; or
  2.  with  intent  to  cause  the  death  of  a police officer or peace
officer, where such officer was in the course of performing his  or  her
official  duties  and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that such victim was a police officer or peace officer, he or she causes
the death of such officer or another police  officer  or  peace  officer
under  circumstances  which  do  not constitute murder because he or she
acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in
paragraph (a) of subdivision  one  of  section  125.25.  The  fact  that
homicide   was  committed  under  the  influence  of  extreme  emotional
disturbance constitutes a mitigating  circumstance  reducing  murder  to
aggravated manslaughter in the first degree or manslaughter in the first
degree  and  need  not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this
subdivision.
  Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.

S 125.25 Murder in the second degree.
  1.  With  intent  to  cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of  such  person  or  of  a  third  person;  except  that  in  any
prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
  (a)  The  defendant  acted  under  the  influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,  the
reasonableness  of  which  is  to  be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's  situation  under  the  circumstances  as  the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute  a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime; or
  (b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing  or  aiding,  without
the  use  of  duress  or  deception,  another  person to commit suicide.
Nothing contained in this paragraph shall  constitute  a  defense  to  a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second
degree or any other crime; or
  2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,
he  recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another person, and thereby causes the death of another person; or
  3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons,  he  commits
or  attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the
first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual  abuse  in
the  first  degree, aggravated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree,
or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance
of  such  crime  or  of  immediate  flight  therefrom,  he,  or  another
participant,  if  there  be any, causes the death of a person other than
one of the participants; except  that  in  any  prosecution  under  this
subdivision,  in which the defendant was not the only participant in the
underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
  (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way  solicit,  request,
command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
  (b)  Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or
substance readily capable of causing death or  serious  physical  injury
and  of  a  sort  not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding
persons; and
  (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
  (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe  that  any  other  participant
intended  to  engage  in  conduct  likely  to result in death or serious
physical injury; or
  4. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,
and being eighteen years old or more the defendant recklessly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury  or  death
to  another  person  less  than  eleven years old and thereby causes the
death of such person; or
  5. Being eighteen years old or more, while in the course of committing
rape in the first, second or third degree, criminal sexual  act  in  the
first,  second  or  third  degree,  sexual  abuse  in  the first degree,
aggravated sexual abuse in the first, second, third or fourth degree, or
incest in the first, second or third degree, against a person less  than
fourteen  years  old,  he  or she intentionally causes the death of such
person.
  Murder in the second degree is a class A-I felony.

S 125.26 Aggravated murder.
  A person is guilty of aggravated murder when:
  1.  With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes
the death of such person,  or  of  a  third  person  who  was  a  person
described  in  subparagraph  (i), (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (a) of this
subdivision engaged at  the  time  of  the  killing  in  the  course  of
performing his or her official duties; and
  (a) Either:
  (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
thirty-four of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the
time  of  the  killing  engaged  in  the course of performing his or her
official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have  known
that the victim was a police officer; or
  (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of  subdivision  twenty-one,  subdivision  twenty-three,  twenty-four or
sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10  of  the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course  of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that the victim  was  such  a  uniformed
court  officer,  parole  officer,  probation officer, or employee of the
division for youth; or
  (iii) the intended victim was an  employee  of  a  state  correctional
institution  or  was  an  employee  of  a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction  law,  who
was  at  the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known  that  the  victim  was  an  employee  of  a  state   correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; and
  (b)  The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime; or
  2. (a) With intent to cause the death of a person less  than  fourteen
years  old, he or she causes the death of such person, and the defendant
acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a  course  of
conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior
to  the victim's death. As used in this subdivision, "torture" means the
intentional and depraved infliction of extreme  physical  pain  that  is
separate  and  apart  from  the  pain  which  otherwise  would have been
associated with such cause of death; and
  (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of  the
commission of the crime.
  3. In any prosecution under subdivision one or two of this section, it
is an affirmative defense that:
  (a)  The  defendant  acted  under  the  influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,  the
reasonableness  of  which  is  to  be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's  situation  under  the  circumstances  as  the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute  a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
aggravated manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in  the  first
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree; or
  (b)  The  defendant's  conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress  or  deception,  another  person  to  commit  suicide.
Nothing  contained  in  this  paragraph  shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, aggravated manslaughter in
the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree or any other  crime
except murder in the second degree.
  Aggravated murder is a class A-I felony.

S 125.27 Murder in the first degree.
  A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
  1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person; and
  (a) Either:
  (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of
the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended
victim was a police officer; or
  (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or
sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a
uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee
of the division for youth; or
  (iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who
was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; or
  (iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was
confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody
upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence
commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate
term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of
which was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing,
the defendant had escaped from such confinement or custody while serving
such a sentence and had not yet been returned to such confinement or
custody; or
  (v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior
occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the
intended victim`s testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether
or not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended
victim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and
the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for
such prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family
member of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the
killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the
testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate
family member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal
action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of
exacting retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony.  As
used in this subparagraph "immediate family member" means a husband,
wife, father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent,
grandparent, stepchild or grandchild; or
  (vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the
killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended
victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the
receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or
from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of
a party to such agreement; or
  (vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the  course  of
committing  or  attempting  to  commit  and  in  furtherance of robbery,
burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in  the  first
degree,  arson  in  the first degree or second degree, rape in the first
degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree,  sexual  abuse  in  the
first  degree,  aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape in
the first degree, or in the  course  of  and  furtherance  of  immediate
flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the
course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit
the  crime  of murder in the second degree; provided however, the victim
is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes  and,  provided
further  that,  unless  the  defendant's  criminal  liability under this
subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person
to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to  section
20.00  of  this  chapter,  this  subparagraph  shall not apply where the
defendant's criminal liability is based  upon  the  conduct  of  another
pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or
  (viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with
intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional
person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons;
provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal
transaction; or
  (ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted
of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article,
or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if
committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such
sections; or
  (x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner
pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting
torture upon the victim prior to the victim`s death. As used in this
subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of
extreme physical pain; "depraved" means the defendant relished the
infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing
debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of
pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or
  (xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more
additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions
within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar
fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or
  (xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision
twenty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the
defendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the
killing, a judge; or
  (xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as
defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this
chapter; and
  (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
  2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative
defense that:
  (a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant`s situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the
second degree; or
  (b) The defendant`s conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.
Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.
  Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.

S 125.40 Abortion in the second degree.
  A person is guilty of abortion in the second degree when he commits an
abortional act upon a female, unless such abortional act is justifiable
pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
  Abortion in the second degree is a class E felony.

S 125.45 Abortion in the first degree.
  A person is guilty of abortion in the first degree when he commits
upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act
which causes the miscarriage of such female, unless such abortional act
is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
  Abortion in the first degree is a class D felony.

S 125.50 Self-abortion in the second degree.
  A female is guilty of self-abortion in the second degree when, being
pregnant, she commits or submits to an abortional act upon herself,
unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three
of section 125.05.
  Self-abortion in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

S 125.55 Self-abortion in the first degree.
  A female is guilty of self-abortion in the first degree when, being
pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks, she commits or submits to an
abortional act upon herself which causes her miscarriage, unless such
abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section
125.05.
  Self-abortion in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

S 125.60 Issuing abortional articles.
  A person is guilty of issuing abortional articles when he
manufactures, sells or delivers any instrument, article, medicine, drug
or substance with intent that the same be used in unlawfully procuring
the miscarriage of a female.
  Issuing abortional articles is a class B misdemeanor.